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IV 
SCIENCE IN THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION 
N THIS title the only word which does not give any I serious difficulty to  a scientist is “History.” But he is 
really uneasy about the two others, “Science” and “Civiliza- 
tion.” Fortunately, if one of the principles of what we shall 
call good thinking is the formation of good definitions, the 
scientist, or a t  least the mathematician, solves his problem 
by choosing them, logically speaking, arbitrarily. And if 
somebody dares to  ask him, “Why this definition?” he has 
the right t o  answer-and generally uses this right, as he does 
in a freshman class when interrupted by a “Why?” after 
having begun, “Let a be positive”-“Because I desire it!” 
It would be relatively easy to  find a suitable definition for 
each of the two words separately. The  difficulty arises from 
the fact tha t  both occur in the same title. One cannot hope 
tha t  the auditor will forget the given definition of “Civiliza- 
tion” when tha t  of “Science” is being proposed. These two 
notions are so related tha t  it would be most agreeable to 
give to  Science a meaning so large, and to  Civilization a sense 
so strict, tha t  the lecture would be over after having merely 
suggested that,  by definition, they constitute the same thing. 
It is difficult to  give a definition of our entities without 
reducing these words to  others perhaps more difficult to  
define; we shall instead, contrary to  all mathematical rules, 
appeal to the imagination and to  concrete experience. 
In  a French dictionary which is generally considered a 
good one, we find : “Civilization-action of civilizing. Anti- 
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thesis-Barbarism”; and, “To civilize-to refine customs.’’ 
Of course the dictionary makes here a fundamental mistake; 
or, if you prefer, we do not want this definition. This mistake 
could be compared in physics t o  a confusion between “po- 
tential” and “difference of potentials.” Civilization corre- 
sponds to  the second of these two notions and not the first. 
The  antithesis of civilization is not barbarism. Civilization 
is what has been added to  barbarism in order t o  obtain its 
antithesis. This has more than a philological significance. 
This interpretation shows better the dynamical nature which 
characterizes a true civilization. Not only is a stagnant state 
of things contrary t o  the notion we have of civilization, but 
even a uniform speed is not enough. A positive acceleration 
is necessary. If the members of a community live and think 
as they lived and thought fifty years ago without having 
added new ideas, or without having had new expressions of 
a r t  or new ways of understanding social life, we shall not 
say tha t  tha t  community is civilized. 
The  word science is taken here in its typical English and 
French meanings : it means, in other words, “natural science,” 
and not mere knowledge. The German word “Wissenschaft” 
has a larger and thus a less precise meaning. We shall there- 
fore exclude history, social sciences, philology, and humani- 
ties in general, not because we do not consider them as an 
important part of human knowledge, but because the vague 
notion of “natural” we have in our mind excludes this kind 
of activities. Mathematics does constitute a natural science, 
not only because modern physics, chemistry, and other 
branches of typically natura2 sciences could not live without 
mathematical speculation, but because even the most ab- 
stract parts of mathematics as, for instance, topology, theory 
of groups, and others involve relationships between entities 
which, although created a pr ior i ,  represent abstract forms 
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disengaged from Nature;  a t  any rate, the  relations between 
them symbolize relations between natural forms. If we recall 
tha t ,  after all, each science bases its conclusions, by neces- 
sity, only on a finite number of facts concerning the  subject 
studied, we see tha t  abstraction of an object is proper to a 
science. Mathematics thus must be considered, from this 
point of view, as the image of all sciences. We do not t ry  to 
prove tha t  mathematics is the  Queen of Sciences-even 
though we think so! On the contrary, we t r y  only t o  make 
you agree tha t  mathematics is a full Citizen of the  King- 
dom of Science. 
Science and applications of science constitute one-we 
should rather say two-of the components of our civiliza- 
tion. We shall give much more time t o  pure than  to  applied 
science. It is not tha t  we have any contempt for the  latter: 
we agree, of course, tha t  the material achievements due t o  
science constitute one of the terms of the difference, “Anti- 
thesis of Barbarism minus Barbarism.” It happens tha t  the  
purpose of this talk, as we understand it, is t o  compare 
creative, disinterested knowledge with two or three other 
activities of human intellect. On the other hand, two striking 
facts make it possible to assert tha t  applied science, from the  
point of view of its influence on the intellect’s desire t o  under- 
stand the world, or its place in the world, plays only a second- 
ary r61e. First, true as it is tha t  Science a t  the beginning fol- 
lowed its own applications, the technical applications which 
follow Science are relatively very recent. It would be difficult 
to find technical commodities resulting from scientific dis- 
coveries, and historically following these discoveries, realized 
more than two centuries ago. But science did exist in many 
different eras preceding this epoch. Second, since the era of 
great modern discoveries began, only a very small part of 
the  new knowledge has been applied. By far the  most pro- 
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found applications of Newton’s ideas in mechanics have been 
made in astronomy, tha t  is t o  say, in pure science itself, and 
not in technical achievements. 
We shall not t ry  to  enumerate the different terms of what 
constitutes human progress; but let us, besides science, recall 
the most striking intellectual activities : religion, philosophy, 
arts. . . . I n  order t o  show the importance of science we could 
t r y  t o  use a famous method used by mathematicians in order 
t o  prove the independence, with respect t o  one another, of 
different postulates which form an Axiomatic. One then tries 
t o  form axiomatics in which some postulates hold without 
the others being true. 
It seems tha t  Thibet is a good example of a country where 
only religion has been developed to  a high degree; where a 
subtle theology is and has been for centuries the center of 
thought of a whole people, but where science is nonexistent; 
where art  is, in comparison with religious achievements, 
poor; and where philosophy is entirely absorbed by theology. 
There is also the prehistoric example of a community-no- 
body in our day is able t o  say how far this expression may be 
applied in those circumstances-a community where genu- 
inely inspired art  (painting) was probably the only mani- 
festation of the intellect. We have in mind the Cro-Magnon 
man. His wall-paintings were, by their vivacity and inspira- 
tion, infinitely higher than the much later artistic expression 
of the Egyptians. Certainly no science troubled the brain of 
this ancient ancestor of European races; religion, on the other 
hand, was certainly reduced to  magic rites and should not be 
envisaged as a product of intellectual activity. 
B u t  neither the ancient or modern Thibetans, nor the Cro- 
Magnon men could be considered as furnishing an example 
of something even similar to  what we should like to  call 
civilization, if we take as prototypes of civilization that  of 
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ancient Greece, or t ha t  of the Renaissance, or tha t  of our 
modern countries. In  both cases, Thibetan and Cro-Magnon, 
science is totally absent. T h a t  is perhaps the point which 
makes the big difference. Of course a more rigorous evalua- 
tion of the importance of science as an element of civilization 
could be furnished if only it were possible to  find and to  study 
a community where science is the only intellectual activity. 
Perhaps an interesting example would be the comparison, 
from tha t  specific point of view, between Czarist Russia and 
Russia of our day. The  “homo sovieticus,” as some writers 
call the members of the numerous states of the U.S.S.R., has, 
it seems, great admiration for sciences, though the expres- 
sion of other intellectual activities is considerably reduced. 
But the Russian experiment seems to  be too young to  furnish 
a decisive proof of any proposition concerning the impor- 
tance of science when other elements are missing. 
In  studying the total expansion of human intelligence, the 
French philosopher Auguste Comte thought t ha t  he had dis- 
covered the fundamental law tha t  each of our principal con- 
ceptions, every branch of our knowledge, passes successively 
through three different theoretical states : theological, meta- 
physical, and scientific. 
I n  Comte’s mind the latest state, the scientific or positi- 
vistic state as he calls it,  is the highest achievement of the 
human mind as far as the perception of the external world is 
concerned. We do not accept the philosophy of Comte since 
we believe tha t  the three theoretical states mentioned cor- 
respond t o  three different and independent states of our 
mind; and we meet every day men who, in different moments 
of their lives, we should even say in different hours of each 
day, are under the influence of one of these states of mind. 
For these individuals none of the three states is subject t o  
the others. But it is impossible not t o  accept Comte’s law as a 
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historical principle. It seems obvious t h a t  a t  the beginning 
the human spirit tried t o  determine the  intimate nature of 
things, the first or last reason of phenomena. This was the  
theological state. Then man, or a t  least the professional 
thinker, tried t o  replace the  supernatural causes by abstract 
forces or abstract matters t o  which he gave different names; 
this is the metaphysical state. And only a t  the last stage did 
he t r y  t o  formulate statements of physical laws based on 
experiments or did he t ry  t o  idealize some of nature’s laws. 
This is the scientific state. 
Only in modern times have the rights and the fields of in- 
vestigation of each of these three branches of human intelli- 
gence been delimited. It happened and it still happens tha t  
each one of these branches overlaps the  neighbors’ fields of 
activities, but essentially they are independent. 
Hence until our recent epoch the history of human intelli- 
gence is a periodic function of t ime; every period, as far as 
the  desire for the understanding of natural phenomena is 
concerned, is itself a succession of three different eras: 
theological, metaphysical, scientific. 
Writers attr ibute the honor of creation of disinterested, 
rational sciences t o  the  Greeks. As a matter of fact, the  
ancient physicists of the Ionian School, such as Thales of 
Miletus (640-598 B.c.), author of a famous cosmology 
where water played the fundamental r6le;Anaximander (610- 
597 B.c.), for whom the eternal substance was the basis of 
things; and Anaximenes (?-480 B.c.), for whom air was the 
great principle-all these physicists, in their metaphysical 
speculations, achieved the  “laicization” of ancient oriental 
religions, principally those of Chaldea and Egypt. 
But these same Masters of the Ionian School were perhaps 
the first men t o  lay down a bridge between metaphysics and 
pure science. Thales originated, starting from empirical rules, 
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the  science of deductive geometry; he was able t o  predict an 
eclipse. Anaximander observed the revolution of the heavens 
with the pole star as center, and understood the existence of 
the other half of the heavenly sphere. 
It seems tha t  in Pythagoras (582-aft. 507 B.c.) and his 
School the three fundamental tendencies, described above, 
met. If he came back t o  mysticism-a mysticism based on 
the knowledge of numbers-he also experimented with sound 
and gave deductive proofs for geometrical theorems. It seems 
tha t  he already knew the material of the first two books of 
Euclid. A t  any rate, he gave a real proof of the famous 
theorem, bearing his name, on right-angled triangles. 
But certainly the most learned man of Greek Antiquity, 
the man who gave the greatest number of systematic theories 
in scientific fields already available, or introduced by him- 
self, was Aristotle (384-322 B.c.). 
His general ideas were of course too often wrong. For in- 
stance, contrary to  Plato who had foreseen inertia, Aristotle 
asserted tha t  an acting cause was necessary at  every moment 
in order t o  keep a body moving. But  he had ideas on planets, 
comets, and meteors. He was the first, in his Meteorologics, 
t o  treat chemical questions. He gave, for instance, ideas- 
of course false-on the origin of metals and minerals and on 
properties of composite bodies. In  biology he used direct ob- 
servation and inquiry on different animals. He used dissec- 
tion and vivisection. 
Aristotle’s ideas in physics were particularly wrong, and 
the admiration and authority by which his name was sur- 
rounded during many centuries-and which were so merited 
by the genius of his daring spirit, if not by the actual dis- 
coveries-constituted one of the most formidable obstacles 
in the expansion of mankind’s thought. The  earth, though 
spherical, was the center of the universe. I n  a vacuum the 
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speed of fall would be the same for all bodies, but, argued 
Aristotle, this is obviously impossible. Thus follows the im- 
possibility of a vacuum. He refused to  believe in the atomistic 
theory already introduced and developed by Leucippus (5th 
cent. B.c.) and Democritus (460?-362? B.c.). 
Feeling the necessity of experiments for the formulation of 
natural laws, Aristotle was still slave of the metaphysical 
desires of his time. He needed, if not “fundamental ele- 
ments,” a t  least “principal qualities”-hot and cold, wet 
and dry. 
Aristotle’s greatest discovery was probably that  of formal 
logic, in forms which are acceptable, almost without varia- 
tions, t o  the modern mind. He created thus the principle of 
rigorous proof. Certainly science would be impossible with- 
out the inductive method. But it would also be impossible 
without the deductive method. This method became rigorous 
because based on sure principles of Aristotelian logic. It is 
true tha t  a modern scientist need not use rules of formal 
logic: he is logical (when he is!), as a result of his general 
education almost by atavism; but this education-this, let 
us say, artificial atavism-is largely due to  the influence of 
Aristotle’s logic on the Greeks who followed him directly. 
The  principal fault of the thinkers of the Middle Ages 
was tha t  they started from false assumptions and made false 
theories by means of rigorous, formal logic. Often the false 
assumptions were introduced by the help of a little swindle 
-they were necessary for the proof of things conceived very 
much a priori .  
The first true scientist of the Hellenic world, that  is t o  say 
the man who was absolutely free from any metaphysical am- 
bition, the man who did not t ry  to  find the leading element 
or the universal force, but who sought in experiments as 
well as in facts the explanation of other facts, was Archi- 
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medes (287?-212 B.c.). He personifies the third link of the 
first chain in history of human thought, the chain: theology, 
metaphysics, science. 
Archimedes measured the circumference of a circle by 
methods which may be regarded as forerunners of the mod- 
ern methods based on the notion of limits-he found the 
ratio of the circumference to  the diameter to  be a quantity 
of about 3:. He found also the ratio of the volume of a cyl- 
inder t o  tha t  of a sphere inscribed in it. 
Archimedes was the creator of mechanics and hydro- 
statics. He  was the first to  introduce a clear idea of relative 
densities of bodies. Everybody knows the famous law of 
Archimedes concerning bodies immersed in a liquid. Archi- 
medes announced the theoretical principle of the lever. 
For the first time in human history scientific principles 
were applied conscientiously : le t  us recall hydraulic screws, 
burning mirrors, the pulley. . . . This is perhaps the 
right moment to  recall tha t  Archimedes used his genius 
to  defend his city; for three years, thanks to  his scien- 
tific advices, Syracuse could hold out against the powerful 
Romans. 
The  French thinker Ernest Renan used t o  speak about 
the Greek Miracle. We should not consider as a miracle, as 
Renan did, the fact t ha t  the Greeks were the first t o  think 
rationally and abstractedly: t ha t  is to  say, in a way not 
immediately related to  applications. But there was a miracle 
in the passage, without a n y  organized opposit ion,  from the 
theological t o  the metaphysical stage and then to  the scien- 
tific. Such passages became very difficult and dangerous in 
later centuries. They were then accomplished in the midst 
of revolutions, not always bloody, i t  is true. 
It seems tha t  with the end of the civilization of the An- 
cient Greeks, and tha t  of their Roman disciples (in science 
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they were almost mere imitators), there ends for a certain 
period the free evolution of human thought. 
Creative minds always were few; they were, indeed, much 
fewer before the invention of printing and the organization 
of popular school systems, because only a few had any 
chance t o  think. But with the birth of a new religion and a 
new morality, the few great minds were all fascinated by 
the creation of a new philosophy. No room was left for things 
which were not directly related to  religious thought. 
When some centuries later the heirs of the first great 
theologians tried to  have some ideas on nature, the Greek 
science had been forgotten and the human mind had lost its 
freedom. This freedom was lost in two different ways. The  
human mind was imprisoned by the limited means and fields 
of thought; it was also limited by  a new fanaticism which 
made free thinking a very dangerous enterprise. 
We shall make a leap over the Dark Ages, although this 
epoch saw the glory of Arabic science. We shall also omit the 
beginning of the Middle Ages with its rich expansion of 
Scholasticism. 
I t  was during the most brilliant epoch of Scholastic Phi- 
losophy, personified by Thomas Aquinas (1225 ?-1274), tha t  
there appeared one of the purest precursors of the new 
scientific thought-Roger Bacon (1214i-1294). He was a 
great precursor, perhaps not so much by his real scientific 
achievements as by his scientific philosophy. 
Bacon studied at  Oxford under Lord Robert Grosseteste, 
Bishop of Lincoln, and Adam Marsh. Universities were or- 
ganized a t  that  time in almost all important countries of 
Europe. The  University of Bologna, in Italy, was created 
about the year 1000. The  Sorbonne was founded only in 
1 2 5 3 ,  but a school of dialectics was organized in Paris as 
early as the beginning of the twelfth century and its con- 
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stitution was adopted by Oxford and Cambridge. Lord 
Robert, Chancellor of Oxford, was very learned; as Bacon 
puts it, “Lord Robert and Friar Adam Marsh were perfect 
in all knowledge.” Bacon was thus educated in an atmos- 
phere of knowledge, if not science. 
But here is exactly Bacon’s great contribution: he was not 
satisfied with “knowledge,” tha t  is to  say with reading of 
Greek and Arabic authors. “The admirable Doctor,” as 
Bacon used to  be called, was the first man of the Christian 
Era who understood the importance of experiment. Cer- 
tainty, he tried to prove, comes only after experience. Friar 
Bacon (he was a Franciscan) did not have an easy life. He 
had many ideas; he had also wealth which he was willing to  
spend for his personal research work, but his Order gave him 
a great amount of trouble. Fortunately for him, and for us, 
Pope Clement IV solved some of his difficulties in ordering 
him to  write up his work. 
We do not know whether we diminish or increase Bacon’s 
fame in saying tha t  it is probably not true, as some believe, 
tha t  he invented gunpowder. But he did know the magnet 
and burning glasses; he described a telescope. He knew 
Arabic mathematics, which was mostly concerned with as- 
trology. What  is more important, he understood the sig- 
nificance of mathematics both as a tool for experimental 
research and as an influence on the qualities of the human 
mind. From tha t  point of view he would have been a good 
educator even in our day. 
Of course Bacon was not free of the mysticism of his time. 
But it can be said tha t  Bacon constitutes a new Miracle- 
we do not speak in the name of his contemporaries! Un- 
fortunately Bacon was too much of an isolated phenomenon 
in those times to  have had any real influence on his immedi- 
ate successors. We must wait for more than two centuries, 
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as a matter of fact until the Renaissance, in order t o  find 
another great and free mind. The  name of the new colossus 
was Leonardo da Vinci. 
Leonardo da  Vinci (1452-1519) is perhaps better known 
to  the world as painter, sculptor, and architect, but he was 
also a great physicist and biologist. No authority, neither 
tha t  of Scholastic thinkers nor tha t  of Aristotle, was strong 
enough to  influence his powerfully original mind. He was 
perhaps also the first man of the Renaissance not to  involve 
theology in the study of natural phenomena. We do not 
know whether Leonardo was acquainted with Bacon's work. 
But for him, too, experience was the only proof of reality. 
He, too, understood the spirit and importance of mathe- 
matics. He understood its abstract nature, but also its pos- 
sibilities for application in the study of a set of experiments. 
It is significant tha t  he was particularly interested in Archi- 
medes' work. And from many points of view he was the 
Archimedes of his time. 
A great number of principles which form the basis of 
rational mechanics were familiar t o  Leonardo da I'inci. It  
should be said tha t  he was very much the engineer. He 
illustrates perfectly well the case where a man is a physicist 
because he is an engineer, and not an engineer because a 
physicist. He seems to  have known the existence of accelera- 
tion during the fall of a body. He gave proofs of the law of 
the lever. He had very clear, if not very true, astrmomical 
ideas. Leonardo da Vinci remarked tha t  liquids in communi- 
cating vessels stand a t  the same level. He studied the laws of 
sound and remarked the analogies between the propagation 
of sound and tha t  of light. He discovered important laws in 
hydrodynamics. 
Leonardo da  Vinci was perhaps the first Christian to  dis- 
sect the human body, and this allowed him to  make very 
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accurate anatomical drawings. He knew the functions of 
the heart. Some think that  he knew the circulation of the 
blood perhaps as well as Harvey did later. 
He did not believe in astrology and alchemy. Unfortu- 
nately Leonard0 da Vinci never published his notes, which 
were discovered much later, but he was in touch with many 
great thinkers of his time and thus participated in the ex- 
pansion of clear and new ideas. 
The  great astronomical revolution-we might have said 
the great revolution in human thinking-was brought about 
by Nicolas Copernicus (Nicolaus Koppernigk) (1473-1 543), 
Polish astronomer and mathematician. 
Ptolemy’s geocentric theory satisfied almost everybody; 
it had the authority of Aristotle; it had also the blessings of 
the great scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas, who 
reigned over all educated minds of the Middle Ages. Theology 
and philosophy accepted this theory willingly, since i t  placed 
the center and the reason of creation-man-in the center 
of the world. It is true that  the mathematical apparatus on 
which Ptolerny’s conception depended was rather heavy, 
since a whole sky had to  move round the Earth. And dis- 
ciples of the Pythagorean School (who became numerous 
through the influence of Neo-Platonism, and especially of 
Saint Augustine’s writings) were rather shocked by this 
lack of harmony. Let us not forget that  everything had to  
be, in the minds of Pythagoreans, mathematically simple. 
Copernicus’ theory had this advantage. 
Above all a fixed sky with fixed stars. I n  the center of 
this sphere the sun. The  farthest moving body is Saturn, 
which revolves round the sun in thirty years; then comes 
Jupiter, completing its revolution in twelve years; next 
Mars, in two years. The  Earth comes afterward (revolving 
in one year, by definition!); then come Venus (nine months) 
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and Mercury (eighty days). Every planet spins on its axis. 
The  trajectories were of course circles. Copernicus was satis- 
fied with his own theory because of its harmony. 
Many objections of even a scientific order were made to  
Copernicus’ theory. If the earth revolves round its axis, why 
does not a body thrown upward fall t o  the west of its point 
of projection ? Would not the earth, if Copernicus’ theory 
were true, disintegrate? But Copernicus replied that a re- 
volving sky with a fixed earth would do so even more. 
Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) went even further: he dared 
to abandon even the idea tha t  the stars were fixed, and be- 
lieved, as we do nowadays, tha t  they are scattered through 
infinite space. This was too much for his time. He was 
burned a t  the stake in 1600. 
Until the sixteenth century there were only isolated peri- 
ods in which epoch-making discoveries were conceived or 
during which science was advancing. In  between two such 
intervals, not only science-physics, astronomy, mathe- 
matics-did not make any progress, but often known prin- 
ciples were forgotten. These progress-making time-intervals, 
in which sporadic expressions of human genius evolved, 
appeared more and more often. But if we t ry  to  go backwards 
from our times through streams of continuous progress, we 
should certainly be obliged t o  stop, a t  the end of the sixteenth 
century, or otherwise be obliged to  make a great leap in order 
to meet Copernicus, almost a century earlier. 
It seems, indeed, tha t  the last great continuous interval- 
we have in mind continuity with respect t o  time-in which 
positive progress has been made, and which continues through 
our day, began with such men as Tycho Brahe, Kepler, 
Galileo. If we are looking for more than continuity in time; 
if we desire t o  establish a continuous path in our scientific 
way of thinking; if we want, still in retrospect, not t o  be 
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obliged to  meet a kind of thinking almost inconceivable for 
scientific minds of the latest centuries, we should stop with 
the last of these three men: Galileo. 
Here are the three astronomical laws of Kepler based on 
observations of Tycho Brahe: “ ( I )  The  trajectories of planets 
are ellipses with the sun in one focus, ( 2 )  the area swept 
inside such a trajectory by the straight line joining the 
center of the planet to  the center of the sun is proportional 
t o  the time, (3 )  the squares of the periodic times which the 
different planets take to  describe their trajectories are pro- 
portional to  the cubes of their mean distances from the 
sun.” These three laws constitute an important part of the 
sum total of human knowledge. And the astronomical 
achievements of many years which followed directly Kep- 
ler’s epoch were based on his discoveries. 
But the spirit which guided Kepler in his research was still 
of Pythagorean type-the nostalgia for the greatest geomet- 
rical harmony in the world. Fortunately, in its first approxi- 
mation the truth about nature is harmonious; or it would be 
truer to  say that we call harmony one of the properties of an 
idealized, simplified (too often over-simplified) world. 
Galileo no longer cared for finding first or ultimate causes. 
As a matter of fact he did not care for causes, tha t  is reasons, 
a t  all. He wanted only to  know how things happen; he 
wanted merely to  describe phenomena. This is also the 
modern point of view. When a physicist or an astronomer 
gives a mathematical theory of a set of happenings, he does 
not t ry  to  explain all of them; he merely explains some of 
them by some others. Mathematics serves only to make these 
transitions, or to  describe the ways in which the phenomena 
which serve to  explain the other phenomena occur. A scientific 
theorydoes not leave the field of phenomena or the field of their 
idealizations : that  is t o  say, their mental simplification. 
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This principle is one of the most important axioms of our 
scientific civilization. It makes the difference between a 
professionally educated scientist and the layman who always 
has the kind of mysticism which we could call the pre-scien- 
tific “Why?” The nonscientific mind always wants t o  know 
too little but also too much. The great break-through, if you 
allow me this expression, in scientific thought was made 
when scientists were freed from the search for metaphysical 
reasons. They began t o  know how to  limit themselves. Phe- 
nomena are explained only by other phenomena, which in 
turn serve t o  explain still other phenomena. Galileo was the 
first man, in the time-interval which continues through our 
day, t o  have this conception of science. 
It is perhaps due mostly to  the fact that  he invented or, a t  
least, materially realized the telescope. He had enough to  
do in his lifetime just in looking and in systematizing all he 
saw. And he did see a great many things. He could confirm, 
by observation, Copernicus’ theory. New stars gave perhaps 
the first reality to  the idea of infinity. He saw that the moon 
was covered with hills. 
But the principal personal work of Galileo remains the 
foundation of dynamics. Causes are needed for acceleration 
and not for velocity. Of course only later Newton showed 
how causes of acceleration produce those accelerations. Galileo 
found that after running down one plane, a ball will run up 
another t o  the height of the starting point (friction being neg- 
lected). He discovered the law of isochronism of small oscilla- 
tions of a pendulum and used his studies for the regulation 
of the clock. 
Galileo was the first scientist as we understand the term 
today. He was also one of the last ones to  suffer from religious 
fanaticism for his astronomical ideas-specifically for his 
proof of the improved theory of Copernicus. His book, pub- 
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lished in Florence in 1632, was denounced by the Inquisition, 
and at  seventy he was obliged to  recant, on his knees, these 
heretical theories of the universe. “E pur si muove!’’-‘rAnd 
yet it moves”-were later his famous (and perhaps apocry- 
phal!) words. 
The  expansion of physical science-in its larger meaning 
as the science of phenomena-and that  of mathematics are so 
related tha t  the birth of an idea in one of these disciplines 
follows that  of an idea in the other one. Mathematics used 
by men of experimental knowledge inspired mathematicians 
and gave them the first elements to be extended and codified. 
But men with mathematical talent felt also tha t  something 
completely new had to  be invented in mathematics in order 
t o  provide a fresh impetus t o  the physical understanding of 
the world. The  seventeenth century saw the beginning of 
this double collaboration-collaboration at  a distance. It 
was also in the seventeenth century that  the Greek Miracle 
-love and understanding of pure and disinterested mathe- 
matical thinking-found its reincarnation in its almost mod- 
ern forms. 
I n  connection with pre-Newtonian mathematics, three 
names have to  be cited: Descartes, Fermat, and Pascal. 
In  his famous book called Geometry, Descartes laid down 
the foundations of analytic geometry. Not only had Des- 
cartes by his discovery introduced a new branch of mathe- 
matical science, but he had introduced a method of the ut- 
most importance for the whole of mathematics. Analytic ge- 
ometry made possible the finest study of geometrical figures 
by analysis, but it also made possible the intuitive study of 
analysis by means of geometry. From this double point of 
view it played later on a very important r81e in Newton’s 
discoveries. Descartes insisted upon the fact that  the equa- 
tion of a curve allows the study of all its properties. We shall 
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not speak here about other technical mathematical dis- 
coveries of Descartes. Let us only remark that  there is not 
a single exact science or a single technical domain in which 
Descartes’ ideas are not applied. 
Fermat was one of the greatest precursors of modern pure 
mathematics. It could be said tha t  he founded the theory 
of numbers, one of the most beautiful and one of the least 
useful parts of mathematics from the point of view of tech- 
nical applications. It would be wrong to  take this assertion 
in a derogatory sense. I t  is pure mathematics, mathematics 
for mathematics’ sake, which has made possible the progress 
of other parts of this science. It is necessary to push pure 
mathematics very far in order t o  find in this arsenal of pure 
knowledge a few truths useful for applications-few, tha t  
is, with respect t o  the whole body of mathematical knowl- 
edge. It is because mathematicians have had this pure 
curiosity tha t  they invented analytic functions, absolute 
calculus, and matrices, which served afterwards for the 
foundation of modern theories of electricity, the theory of 
relativity, and others. But we feel almost sorry to  give such 
reasons for the usefulness of pure mathematics. Mathema- 
ticians create pure mathematics as musicians write music, as 
poets write poems, as philosophers think about space and 
time. It is true tha t  great physical applications of mathe- 
matical theories are made, almost despite the discoverers of 
these mathematical theories; but one of the noblest char- 
acteristics of our civilization is the existence of poets, musi- 
cians, and pure mathematicians. 
Pascal was the discoverer of the calculus of probabilities. 
Unlike Fermat, Pascal would not need to  apologize since 
probability is used in physics, biology, and even such practi- 
cal fields of our life as statistics, economics, and insurance. 
With the end of the seventeenth century begins a new era in 
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mankind’s thinking. In  1687 Newton had published the first 
edition of his Mathematical Principles of Na tura l  Philosophy. 
It could be said without exaggeration that this book consti- 
tutes the greatest scientific work realized by a single man. It 
may be said that Newton discovered the Universe, although 
he gave mostly its mechanical aspects, but a t  his time 
the mechanical aspect was the only aspect of the external 
world. 
In  establishing the  law of gravitation and the equation of 
dynamics Newton gave the synthesis of the visible world, a t  
any rate of t h e  world visible in the seventeenth and eight- 
eenth centuries. The parts of the Universe invisible even by 
a powerful telescope became potentially, if not actually, 
visible by mathematically necessary inferences from New- 
ton’s laws. 
In separating the two notions, mass and weight, Newton 
created one of the most important abstractions of the human 
mind: matter-a concept as fundamental t o  mechanics as 
space and time. 
The old mathematics was not a sufficient instrument for 
the new mechanical world. But Newton created the in- 
finitesimal calculus. This great achievement of mathe- 
matical thinking was shared also by Leibnitz. Leibnitz’ nota- 
tions seemed, a t  least a t  tha t  time, clearer, and were rapidly 
adopted by continental Europe; but, curiously enough, in 
modern mechanics it is often preferable to  use Newton’s 
original notations. Until very recently, and apart from a few 
exceptions, infinitesimal calculus and mathematics have 
been almost synonymous since Newton. 
In one word, Newton created a mechanical world, the laws 
of which were expressed in forms of infinitesimal calculus. 
The  abstraction of the operations used in establishing or in 
expressing these laws constitutes the new abstract world. 
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Newton was the creator of the two: the mechanical and 
abstract worlds. 
Newton created modern optics in establishing the law of 
decomposition of white light by the prism as well as many 
other fundamental principles of physical optics. 
Newton’s work brought into being a new spirit. It seemed 
to  his successors that  potentially the world was understood. 
Only details remained to  be established. It was sufficient, 
they thought, from now on t o  look, to  look ably; but the 
principles were there. Determinism and mechanical Materi- 
alism were born. The  greatest part of the difference between 
the thinking of man nowadays and in the seventeenth cent- 
ury is due directly or indirectly to  Newton. We do not 
hesitate t o  speak about the pre-Newtonian and post-New- 
tonian man, or a t  least the pre-Newtonian and post-New- 
tonian thinker. 
The  eighteenth century was, as far as astronomy, mathe- 
matics, and physics are concerned, rich and original; but 
astronomy became mostly celestial mechanics, and mathe- 
matics the theory of differential equations related t o  me- 
chanics. Such men as d’Alambert, Legendre, Lagrange, La- 
place, and in a large measure Euler, all great mathematicians, 
lived in Newton’s world and their discoveries had one pur- 
pose: to continue t o  refine and t o  complete (they thought it 
was possible) the mechanical explanation of the world. 
Chemistry was much slower in progressing, and it was 
only with the discoveries of Lavoisier tha t  this science be- 
came free from mysticism and all kinds of semi-philosophical 
ideas. Lavoisier decomposed water into hydrogen and oxy- 
gen, and thus, a t  the same time, discovered these two ele- 
ments. By showing the properties of oxygen he was able to  
reject the old conception of phlogiston-that very special 
matter with negative weight. He  proved that gases have 
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ordinary properties of matter. He  proved tha t  matter, even 
if it changes its forms, does not change in amount. 
It is curious to  notice how some theories survived from 
antiquity by passing through the stages mentioned a t  the 
beginning of this lecture. Such was the atomic conception 
which all through the Greek epoch and the Middle Ages at- 
tracted metaphysical minds. It lived without any experi- 
mental basis: only false causality and not less false finality 
seemed to  justify its existence. Only a t  the beginning of the 
nineteenth century did Dalton (1766-1844) give a scientific 
and experimental foundation to  this theory. 
We enter into the nineteenth century-the Scientific Age. 
\5’e have spoken only about certain branches of science, not 
because the other branches were not cultivated much earlier, 
but because the discoveries in those scientific disciplines do 
not seem to have profoundly affected the human mind until 
the nineteenth century. They constituted either sets of 
nebulous conceptions, or isolated facts which nobody seemed 
to  recognize as fundamentals of the world to  come. Elec- 
tricity, magnetism, the relationship of both to  the theory of 
light, biology, anthropology, the theory of heredity, modern 
mathematics, and the new physics were only born, one may 
say, in the nineteenth century. 
But  it seems to  us that  from the point of view of pure 
science, as great as the discoveries of the nineteenth century 
may have been, as revolutionary as they were, the Revolu- 
tion of the Intellect, the  almost physiological revolution, 
was accomplished before. One has the impression tha t  during 
the Newtonian epoch, and even a century before, the human 
spirit struggled in cleaning up a mine-field, but once in a 
free field-free from obscurantism-this spirit could walk 
fast, although not without great difficulties. 
It may be said that  during the nineteenth and twentieth cen- 
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turies human ignorance has been in complete rout. Talent and 
genius found in their path only technical, professional diffi- 
culties; but since means of avoiding them are infinite, infinite 
also were new discoveries, new theories, and new sciences. 
At the same time scientists came systematically and con- 
scientiously in contact with everyday life. Results of dis- 
coveries of almost every science were used in improving 
human life. Engineers familiarized with the newest achieve- 
ments of scientific research were able to  change completely 
the conditions of men’s lives. Since some of my colleagues 
have given or will give the specific results of these applica- 
tions, I shall not presume t o  describe them. M y  colleagues 
will do that  much better. 
Let us only say that  since the title of this lecture is 
“Science in the History of Civilization” and not “The His- 
tory of Science,” and since we have tried to  follow the dif- 
ferent steps of the influence of science on human intellect 
until the moment when this intellect became free and full of 
desires and immense possibilities, we think that we should 
stop here. 
S. MANDELBROJT. 
